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THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF CORPORATE PROFITS
CONSTANTINE N. KATSORIS*
INTRODUCTION
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was
the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the
epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the
season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had every-
thing before us, we had nothing before us .... It was the
year of Our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-
five.'
Nineteen hundred and seventy-nine was also a year of great
expectations 2 and unsettling turmoil.$ It was a year in which our
national will was tested in the most direct manner.4 The unchal-
lengeable concept of diplomatic immunity was breached. The
threat of an oil cutoff was used to change national policies and af-
fect vital interests." We experienced double-digit inflation,7 an eco-
nomic slowdown, 8 and soaring interest rates.9 Foreign investors in-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.S. 1953, Fordham University;,
J.D. 1957, Fordham University, L.L.M. 1963, New York University.
1. C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two Crris 3 (Washington Square Press ed. 1957).
2. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, 18 Int'l Legal Materials No. 2.
3. See, e.g., China Invades Vietnam, NEwswEEK, Feb. 16, 1979, at 44; Halloran, Strife
in Seoul: U.S. Fears a Wider Danger, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 4; Middle-
ton, Russian Troops In Afghanistan: Uncertain Road, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, § A, at 17,
col. 1; On The Scene: A Look At Ranting in Iran, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 1979,
at 30; A Soviet Pincer Moves Toward Mideast Oil, BusiNESS WEEK, Dec. 24, 1979, at 60;
Wallace, Indo-China: Tinderbox For Major Powers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 17,
1979, at 46.
4. See, e.g., Angry Attacks on America, TIME, Dec. 3, 1979, at 24; Iran: The Test of
Wills, Tim, Nov. 26, 1979, at 20.
5. See, e.g., Hostage Game: Nightmare Goes On, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., Dec. 17,
1979, at 25.
6. See, e.g., Japan Rebuffs Iran Plea To Be Neutral in Crises, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,
1979, § A, at 4, col. 6; Worldgram, U.S. Naws & WORLD RaP., Aug. 13, 1979, at 27.
7. See Rattner, '79 Prices Up 13.3% In Biggest Increase For A Year Since '46, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 6.
8. Although there is some disagreement as to whether an actual "recession" commenced
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creasingly acquired American assets,10 while many prominent
companies closed plants, idled capacity, and laid off employees.1
As we enter the 1980's, the problems of the world seem insur-
mountable. This article will not dwell on our future involvement in
world affairs, except to state that isolation and retrenchment
would be unthinkable, if not impossible.1 2 Whatever our role, we
must have the capability of acting quickly and decisively: a goal
requiring independence and great moral, economic and military
strength.13  6
The more one reads about our economy, the more one is baf-
fled and alarmed.14 Permanent solutions to economic problems are
in 1979, there is no question that business activity declined. See, e.g., Conference Board
Says Mild Recession is Under Way Now, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 3, col. 4. But see
Rattner, The Recession: It's Just Around The (Next) Corner, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, §
3, at 1, col. 2; Shabecoff, Unemployment Off to 5.8% for Month In Spite of Layoffs, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 8, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 3.
9. See, e.g., Hawkins & Richert, Buyers Resist A.T. & T. Unit's $450 Million Of Deben-
tures Despite Record High Yield, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1980, at 35, col. 1. See also Kaufman:
Rate Peak Still Ahead, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1979, § D, at 5, cQl. 6.
10. See, e.g., Drinkhall Guyon, Pieces of America, Real-Estate Purchases By Foreign-
ers Climb, Stirring Wide Debate, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Foreign Invest-
ments Hit High in '79, Group Says, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1980, at 16, col. 3; Rout, Buying
American: Weak Dollar, Stocks Spur Foreigners To Seek Acquisitions in The U.S., Wall
St. J., Aug. 21, 1979, at 1, col 6.
11. See, e.g., Tomorrow, A Look Ahead From The Nation's Capital, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 1979, at 15; U.S. Business: Trends That Shape The Future, U.S.
NEws & WoRLD RaP., Dec. 17, 1979, at 85; When Giant Industries Falter, N.Y. Times, Dec.
3, 1979, § A, at 24, col 1.
12. See Reston, 'The Dangerous Decade', N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1979, § A, at 31, col. 5.
13. In a recent speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York the Prime
Minister of Great Britian, Margaret Thatcher, referring to the eighties as the dangerous
decade, cautioned:
The last 10 years have not been a happy period for the Western democracies,
domestically or internationally .... Self questioning is essential to the health
of any society. But we have perhaps carried it too far-and, carried to extremes,
it causes paralysis. The time has come when the West-above all Europe and
the United States--must begin to substitute action for introspection.
Let us go down in history as the generation which not only understood what
needed to be doze but again had the strength, the self-discipline and the resolve
to see it through. That is our generation, that is our task for the Eighties.
Address by Prime Minister Thatcher, quoted in Reston, id. See also Naylor, The U.S.
Needs Strategic Planning, BUSNMSS WEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 18.
14. See Bowen, The Decade Ahead: Not So Bad If We Do Things Right, FORTUNE, Oct.
8, 1979, at 82; How Deep a Slump? What Experts Expect, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RaP., Dec.
17, 1979, at 56; Lewis, Gold Market Sends a Message: These Are Very Troubled Times,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1980, § 4, at 3, col. 2; Lewis, O.E.C.D. Outlook Is Gloomy, N.Y. Times,
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elusive. Treating one financial malaise often aggravates another
sector of the economy, necessitating a delicate balancing of con-
flicting interests.15 Furthermore, the problems are complicated by
the constant influence of foreign forces.16 Nevertheless, most econ-
omists agree that any solution will require enormous funding.
Among the most effective inducements to the commitment of
private capital and action are our tax laws. At present, tax credits
are used to encourage a wide range of activities, from energy con-
servation 17 to hiring and training the unskilled, disadvantaged and
unemployed.' More important in this context, the investment
credit 19 and accelerated depreciation 0 options have already stimu-
lated billions in new investments. The list of tax incentives is al-
most endless. 21 When tax law is an inducement for economic activ-
ity, it must be used innovatively and fairly. Unfortunately, the
arena of tax reform is often charged with emotion and fraught with
self-interest. Understandably, differences exist among lawmakers;
however, our legislators should not support proposals that are
made solely for elective purposes.2 2 They should seek long range
solutions and not merely stop gap measures. Moreover, in charting
our economic course they cannot ignore the realities of the
marketplace.
Unfortunately, the public has little, if any, confidence in our
Dec. 20, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 6; The Decade Ahead: More Inflation Is Seen, But Many
Economists Voice Optimism on 80's, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 1; The Petro-Crash
of the '80s, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 19, 1979, at 176. Indeed, a recent poll indicated that re-
spect for economic forecasters was "only marginally ahead of stockbrokers and astrologers,
and well behind such categories as plumbers and sportscasters." Evans, Confessions of an
Economic Forecaster, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 3, at 16, col. 3.
15. See Moore, A Truism: Recession Slows Inflation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 3, at
18, col. 3; Silk, Economic Scene Unemployment and Inflation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1979, §
D, at 2, col. 1; When Pay Hikes Are Shelved To Save Jobs, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec.
24, 1979, at 79.
16. See Kristol, The Worst Is Yet to Come, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1979, at 24, col. 4; Silk,
Is Soviet Tension Economy's Elixir?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, § D, at 2, col. 1.
17. I.R.C. §§ 44C, 46(a)(10), 48(e).
18. I.R.C. §§ 40, 44B.
19. I.R.C. § 38.
20. I.R.C. § 167(b)(2)-(4).
21. A credit is also used to induce broad-based support for political candidates, I.R.C. §
41, and tax dollars can be directed toward the funding of presidential elections, I.R.C. §
6096. Furthermore, we use the tax laws to fund retirement pensions, I.R.C. §§ 401-407, and
to provide life and health insurance for employees, I.R.C. §§ 79, 106.
22. See Kingon, "To Hell with business!", FiNANcxAL WORLD, Dec. 15, 1979, at 11.
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tax system.23 Indeed, some tax laws and proposals have been re-
ferred to as "obscene" 24 and a "disgrace to the human race."25 Few
quarrel with the aptness of such general descriptions; however,
there is much disagreement over which specific tax provisions war-
rant such criticism. In this author's opinion, one of the most inex-
cusable anomalies of our income tax laws is the double tax on cor-
porate profits that arises from taxing the same income as it is
earned by a corporation"6 and again when it is distributed to its
shareholders. 27
This article will discuss the merits of double taxation of corpo-
rate profits. This discussion may appear to be of minor importance
in comparison with the enormous economic challenges we face in
the next decade. The topic assumes major significance, however,
when one considers that increased equity investment is a corner-
stone of capital formation, 8 which to a great extent, can provide
the economic stimulus essential to our national survival.
I. UNFAIRNESS OF DOUBLE TAXATION
The computation of income tax begins with a compilation of
gross income, broadly defined as "all income from whatever source
derived, 2 9 including amounts received as compensation for ser-
vices, and amounts derived from business, dealings in property, or
other investments such as interest, rents, royalties and dividends.80
The taxpayer subtracts his allowable deductions from this figure to
arrive at his taxable income.$1
23. As to public opinion on the use of tax revenues, see Public in Poll Considers Half
U.S. Taxes Wasted, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 6.
24. See, e.g., An Obscene Tax, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 26, col. 1, where the pro-
posed windfall profit tax was referred to as obscene.
25. See Schellhardt, President Says He May Seek New Tax Cut and Plans Talk on
Steps Regarding Cuba, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
26. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2).
27. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). Because a corporate shareholder is not the ultimate owner of the
shares, the I.R.C. grants a partial or total exclusion for dividends received by corporations.
I.R.C. § 243. See also Committee on Affiliated and Related Corporations, American Bar
Ass'n, Legislative Recommendation to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to apply
a 100 Percent Dividends-Received Deduction to all Dividends Received by a Corporation
from a Domestic Corporation, 32 TAx LAw. 863 (1979).
28. See For The 1980s, A Better Tax Break for Capital, BusnNESS WEEK, Dec. 24, 1979,
at 62.
29. LR.C. § 61.
30. Id.
31. See LR.C. § 161.
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The tax imposed on a specific amount of taxable income varies
according to the nature of the gain3 2 and the identity of the tax-
payer. A partnership, for example, is not taxed. Instead, it files an
information return, and its partners report the income, whether ac-
tually distributed or not, on their individual returns.33 Special
items of income and deduction retain their character as they pass
through to the partners.3 Similarly, a corporation electing under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter referred
to as subchapter S corporation) generally has its income taxed only
to its shareholders.35 On the other hand, estates and ordinary
trusts 6 are taxed on their income. To the extent the income is dis-
tributable or distributed, however, it is deducted by the trust or
estate and taxed to the beneficiaries.3  If it is taxed to the estate or
trust, those entities generally are treated the same as individuals,
and are taxed at similar rates.8 Similarly, income earned or re-
ceived by individuals, other than corporate dividends, is taxed only
once.
In contrast to the tax treatment of all other entities, the in-
come of a regular corporation is taxed twice. It is taxed to the cor-
poration as it is earned and is taxed again when distributed to the
shareholders, either as ordinary income 9 or capital gain. 0 In fact,
a tax on the accumulated earnings of closely held corporations en-
32. See, e.g., LR.C. § 1201(a) (alternate tax treatment provided for the net capital gains
of corporations).
33. See I.R.C. § 702(a).
34. See I.R.C. § 702(b).
35. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379. The qualifications for and the effects of a subchapter S election
are described in D. KAHN & P. GANN, CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATON OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS 515-34 (1979).
36. Generally, an "ordinary trust" is one other than a "grantor trust" (where because of
retained dominion or control the income remains taxable to the grantor) or "special trusts,"
i.e., trusts used in special situations such as pension trust, common trust funds, alimony
trusts and trusts taxable as corporations. For a more detailed distinction between ordinary
trusts, grantor trusts and special trusts, see A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATTMACHR, INCOME TAXA-
TION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1-3 (10th ed. 1978).
37. Id. at 5.
38. I.R.C. § l(e). The maximum tax rate, however, on personal service income of an
individual is 50%. I.R.C. § 1348.
39. Corporate distributions are dividends to the extent of earnings and profits and divi-
dends are ordinary income to the shareholder. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316. For a discussion of
earnings and profits see B. Brrrim & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 1 7.03 (4th ed. 1979).
40. A shareholder will have capital gain when he sells his stock, I.R.C. § 1221, and may
have capital gain on a redemption, I.R.C. § 302, or liquidation, I.R.C. §§ 331-333.
1980]
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courages such corporations to distribute their earnings, which thus
results in a double tax.4 1 As for publicly held corporations, which
are generally immune from such dividend-forcing taxes, market in-
vestor expectations often require payment of at least a reasonable
dividend, which again results in a double tax.
Furthermore, profits generated by lending funds to corpora-
tions are taxed differently from those generated by equity financ-
ings of the same corporation. The cost of borrowed money, inter-
est, is tax deductible by the corporation before the remainder is
taxed twice.42 The cost of equity financing, dividends, is not de-
ductible. Why do we allow creditor-investors to take out income
from a corporation, which is not taxed to the corporate debtor,
while equity-investors' income is subjected to a double tax?43
In addition, it may be shown that the income taxation of divi-
dend income does not favorably compare with that of income from
wages. First, the former income is taxed twice,4 while the latter is
taxed only once. Moreover, dividend income can be taxed up to a
70% rate5 while income from wages is protected by a 50% ceil-
ing.4" We seem to recognize that a 70% tax discourages income
earned from labor, but ignore its effect on income earned from cap-
ital. In addition, wages are supplemented by many other forms of
non-taxable compensation such as employer-financed life insur-
ance, medical insurance, and pension plans,'47 which are unavaila-
ble to the equity investor.
41. I.R.C. § 531. This tax varies between 271/2 % to 381/2 %. For a general introduction
to the accumulated earnings tax, see B. Brrrm & J. EusTicE, supra note 39, at 1 8.01.
42. I.R.C. § 163. It may be true that profits exceeding the cost of borrowing inures to
the benefit of the equity investor; however, at today's interest rates, 10-12% returns on
newly issued bonds are not uncommon. Thus, a significant part of the profits generated go
to the creditor-investor. For additional discussion of the problems of raising capital see text
accompanying notes 78-87 infra.
43. In addition, to the extent of his basis, the creditor-investor is not taxed on the
withdrawal of his investment when the corporation repays the debt. On the other hand, in a
close corporation the stockholder, often unable to sell his shares to anyone but the corpora-
tion itself, would likely be taxed upon such redemption as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 302.
44. First to the corporation as it is earned and then to the shareholder as it is distrib-
uted. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
45. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
46. I.R.C. § 1348.
47. See I.R.C. §§ 79, 106, 401-407. Despite this unequal treatment, the Carter adminis-
tration recently proposed that dividend payments be subject to income tax withholding. See
Pierson, Revenue Raising Rebuff? Congress May Fight Gasoline Tax, Withholding on Sav-
ings, Dividends, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1980 at 4, col. 1.
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Why is income earned by a corporation taxed twice, whereas
income earned by other legal entities is taxed once? Perhaps this
discriminatory treatment arose by chance, convenience, or compro-
mise.48 Regardless of its origin, however, its existence does not jus-
48. For the origin and development of corporate taxation in this country, see D. KAHN
& P. GANN, supra note 35, at 1-6:
Congress first enacted a tax on corporate income in 1894 as part of a federal
income tax which imposed a tax of two percent on both individual and corporate
income. Less than a year later, in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Company,
the Supreme Court held that the federal tax on income from real estate and
bersonal property was a "direct" tax and, therefore, unconstitutional since not
apportioned among the states in proportion to population. Since the particular
unconstitutional provisions were part of one unseverable scheme of taxation (in-
cluding the tax on corporate income), the entire 1894 income tax was held to be
unconstitutional.
Demands for a new income tax arose less than fifteen years after Pollock
from Western Republicans and from Democrats. A compromise was reached be-
tween this coalition and conservative Republicans who were opposed to the tax:
an income tax would be imposed on corporations but an individual income tax
would not be passed until the ratification of a constitutional amendment permit-
ting its imposition on all types of income without regard to source. The con-
servative Republicans thus hoped to delay the enactment of a general income
tax by making it contingent upon a constitutional amendment. This approach
also avoided the passage of a general income tax which could be upheld constitu-
tionally only if the Supreme Court reversed itself. As a result of this compro-
mise, a corporate tax of one percent on corporate net income over $5,000 was
passed in 1909 as part of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. It preceded the date of
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment by four years. The Supreme Court in
Flint v. Stone Tracy Company upheld the constitionality of the corporate in-
come tax, stating that it was not a direct tax but an excise tax on the privilege of
conducting business in the corporate form.
A corporate income tax has been in continuous existence since 1909.
Prior to the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1978, the corporate tax was a
three-tier structure, which had been scheduled to return to a two-tier structure
in 1979. The corporate tax consisted of a normal tax and a surtax, but the first
$50,000 of taxable income was exempt from the surtax. The normal tax was 20%
of taxable income in excess of $25,000 of taxable income and 22% of taxable
income in excess of $50,000. Thus, for a corporation's taxable year beginning
prior to January 1, 1979, taxable income in excess of the $50,000 surtax exemp-
tion was taxed at a 48% rate (22% normal tax plus a 26% surtax).
The 1978 Act reduced corporate tax rates. In so doing, the 1978 Act elimi-
nated the surtax concept and substituted a five-tier graduated rate structure.
For taxable years beginning after 1978, § 11(b) establishes the following rate
schedule for corporate taxable incoine: the first $25,000 of taxable income is
taxed at a 17% rate; the next $25,000 is taxed at a 20% rate; the next $25,000 is
taxed at a 30% rate; the next $25,000 is taxed at a 40% rate; and taxable income
in excess of $100,000 is taxed at a 46% rate. The maximum rate was thus re-
duced from 48% to 46%. The net capital gain of a corporation is taxed at a
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tify its continuance. A corporation and its shareholders are two
separate entities, but there is only one profit. In fact, "the corpora-
tion is simply the aggregate of its owners and can best be charac-
terized as a 'conduit' through which income earned in the corpora-
tion is passed to the shareholders as dividends or retained
earnings. '49 Although the privilege of incorporation and its um-
brella of limited liability allow businesses to raise large amounts of
capital and thus conduct large-scale operations, this benefit hardly
justifies the punitive effect of the double tax. This "benefit" argu-
ment is deficient in several respects.
Most obviously, it is the states, rather than the federal government, that
allow firms to incorporate under their laws. Second, the entire public cost of
the legal machinery necessary for the advantages of incorporation is minis-
cule in comparison to the forty billion dollars in revenue collected through
the federal corporation income tax. Collecting sufficient revenue to cover that
cost is, after all, the most that could be justified under most reasonable inter-
pretations of the benefit principle. Finally, even if the taxation of corpora-
tions were justified on the ground that incorporation provides substantial
benefits, it is far from obvious that a profits tax would be indicated. After all,
the advantages of incorporation (especially limited liability) are often more
relevant for the firm with losses than for the healthy and profitable firm.5°
maximum rate of 28% (§ 1201(a)) plus a minimum tax of 15% on tax preference
in excess of the corporation's total normal tax. Approximately 39% of a corpora-
tion's net capital gain constitutes a tax preference item.
Id.
49. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 532, 535 (1975). But see R.
GooDE, THE CORPORATION INcoME TAx 24-43 (1951). Yet, the tax law has no difficulty in
recognizing the conduit theory in the case of partnerships or subchapter S corporations.
50. McLure, supra note 49, at 536. It has been suggested that the present system is
particularly inequitable in the case of low-income shareholders:
[B]ecause low-income shareholders probably bear, at least in part, the burden of
a proportional corporate tax rate which may be substantially higher than their
individual marginal rates. All shareholders incur the individual tax on distribu-
tions they receive, resulting in a combined corporate and individual tax burden
substantially heavier than their individual marginal rates would produce with
respect to other income. Equity is also adversely affected because high-income
shareholders may avoid the effect of progressive individual rates by causing their
corporations to retain earnings. This effect is compounded by the special tax
provisions reducing the effective corporate rate and by the treatment of gain on
the sale of stock or liquidation of the corporation as capital gain, even if such
gain is attributable to retained earnings.
Special Committee on Simplification, Section of Taxation, American Bar Ass'n, Evaluation
of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax [hereinafter cited as Evaluation], 32
TAX LAw. 563, 597 (1979).
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It has been suggested that a separate corporate tax is justified
because (1) it is a means of improving the allocation of social costs;
(2) it is based upon an ability to pay; and (3) it is helpful as a
means of social control.51 Assuming the validity of these social ar-
guments, it would be fairer to tax all business similarly (albeit at
slightly higher rates) rather than differently on the basis of opera-
tional form. In fact, the progressive individual income tax rates"
seem to satisfy such social needs. Why, therefore, must we add a
layer of taxation at the corporate level to these already steep indi-
vidual rates? Social goals would be better served by a productive
and expanding economy, rather than by one stifled by excessive
taxation.53 Indeed, if carried to an extreme, this social philosophy
could justify a 100% tax on corporate profits.
Opponents to easing the tax on dividend income might further
argue that the present system of corporate taxation is already inte-
grated into the current prices of corporate stock; therefore, re-
moval of double taxation should increase stock prices, resulting in
windfall gains to present shareholders.5 4 Higher stock prices, how-
ever, would also benefit millions of employees and their families by
increasing the investment portfolios of their retirement plans.55
51. See R. GooDs, supra note 49, at 27. See also Surrey, Reflections on "Integration"
of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335, 339 (1975).
52. The rates range from 0-70%. I.R.C. § l(a)-(d).
53. For a related example of the counterproductive effects of excessive taxation based
largely upon social needs, see Katsoris, City's Death Tax and Its Possible Effects, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
Admittedly, no tax is popular. When government reaches its tax saturation
point-as New York City has-then choosing among levies still yet to be im-
posed becomes quite difficult. Understandably, political expediency usually dic-
tates the imposition of the least unpopular tax. Such expediency, however, often
becomes counterproductive.
The City death tax is retrogressive and self-defeating. It will trigger the final
exodus of its more affluent citizens to suburban tax havens outside the City,
thereby further eroding its already deteriorating tax base.
Id. at 4.
54. See R. GOODE, supra note 49 at 26.
55. It should be noted that many pensions are presently underfunded. See J. Flint, The
old folks, FoRBEs, Feb. 18, 1980, at 51, 54:
On page 68 of Gulf & Western Corp.'s last annual report there is a little footnote
about $160 million-"the amount by which vested benefits under our pension
plans exceed market value of assets in the funds, plus balance sheet liabilities."
At AT&T a footnote for 1979 will mention $229 million. At General Motors
Corp., another footnote casually mentions $3.9 billion.
Among all businesses, these liabilities run into the tens of billions of dollars,
1980]
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Similarly, charitable and foundation portfolios would benefit.
Moreover, windfall gains to present shareholders are offset by in-
vestment losses in the past that resulted from such double taxa-
tion. Furthermore, an increase in stock prices might encourage
firms to more frequently satisfy their capital needs through equity
financings; higher prices of equity offerings result in a lower cost to
the corporation of such funds.5 6
Finally, let us examine the net effect of this double taxation
on individuals. Although the top corporate rate of 46% ' is sub-
stantially less than the 70% ceiling applicable to the high levels of
an individual's unearned income, the combination is severe. A cor-
porate tax rate of 46% followed by an individual tax on dividends
at a rite of 70% results in an aggregate rate of 83.8%, leaving an
after-tax profit of 16.2%. This is roughly one-half of the after-tax
profit of 30% on noncorporate profits.58 Such an inconsistency is
hardly insignificant.
no one knows exactly how much. They exist for a variety of reasons: Everyone in
the company isn't going to retire at 5 p.m. tomorrow, so there is no need to have
enough money on hand to pay off everyone's pension immediately, pensions are
regularly increased, and since those increases cover back service-the years an
employee has already put in-it takes time to lay away extra funds; sometimes
the company just has not put enough away. Under government rules the un-
funded pension liability can be amortized over 30 or 40 years.
Unless, of course, it has to be paid off suddenly. Because U.S. Steel is closing
16 facilities, affecting 13,000 workers, many who would have been on the job for
years will take early retirement. Suddenly $413 million was needed for their pen-
sions, plus severance benefits. That helped create a huge $809 million pretax loss
in the last quarter. As part of its pension protection laws, the federal govern-
ment guarantees to make up those unfunded pension liabilities if a company
goes belly up. If Chrysler Corp. went under, for example, the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corp. would grab up to 30% of Chrysler's net worth to meet the bill,
and private pension plans, which now chip in $2.60 per pension plan participant
annually, might have the premium raised about $6 to $7 apiece to pay the tab
for Chrysler. Indeed, that potential bill was one selling point that helped push
the Chrysler aid package through Congress.
56. As to the need to increase equity financings see text accompanying notes 82-126
infra.
57. I.R.C. § 11(b)(5).
58. Although the imposition of local income taxes on these profits would require some
adjustment to these figures, the resulting disparity between the after-tax profits would still
be grossly disproportionate.
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II. UNSOUNDNESS OF DOUBLE TAXATION
A large amount of capital is necessary to build factories and
machinery that will increase productivity, thus moderating infla-
tion59 during this decade. Vast sums are needed for technological
research 0 and to make American products more competitive in the
international and national marketplaces. The increased depen-
dence on foreign oil necessitates additional capital for added oil
exploration and the development of synthetic fuels."1
What will be the source of this capital? Government cannot
directly furnish the capital because its income is largely derived
from taxes on the profits sought to be encouraged. Even if govern-
59. Poor progress on productivity-output per man-hour of work-is one rea-
son for the shortages and rising costs that have plagued this country in recent
times. Productivity is a measure of how efficiently we produce goods and ser-
vices. Gains provide more supplies at lower cost. Declines make costs go up.
Stone, Don't Prime the Pump This Time, Fix It, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 1979, at
80. Well Management's Drag On Productivity, BusiNFss WEEK, Dec. 3, 1979 at 14, discusses
the decline of the rate of productivity growth in the U.S. "We cannot ignore startling
figures such as the fact that the average Japanese auto worker makes 48 to 50 cars per
year compared with 25 for the U.S. worker. The average Japanese steelworker produces
421 tons vs. 250 in the U.S." Id. (emphasis added). This decline is attributed, in part, to a
decrease in the amount of capital equipment available to American workers. See Hogan,
What's Wrong With Our Steel Industry?, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 28, 1979, at 28, col. 1. For
an example of this decrease see Stone, supra this note at 79:
Technological advances are meaningless unless put to work. Many American
industries are burdened by aging and outmoded facilities and are hard pressed
to compete with foreign producers who have more modem plants.
In the last 15 years, Japanese steelmakers have constructed nine 'supermills,'
while U.S. industry has built only one. Our companies can produce no more steel
today than they could 10 years ago. Our consumption of steel has increased, but
the additional supplies we are using are coming from abroad ....
See also Bryant, Productivity: Only Real Cure for Inflation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 12, 1979, at 80; Meadows, A Close-Up Look at the Productivity Lag, FORTUNE, Dec. 4,
1979, at 82; On Losing Productivity-and Face, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1979, § 1 at 16, col. 1;
Serrin, Decline in Productivity in U.S. Spurs Intense Debate and Study, N.Y. Times, Oct.
29, 1979, § D, at 8, col. 4; What Poor Productivity is Doing to Prices, FORTUNE, June 4,
1979, at 9.
60. Our technological advantage over other countries is broadly eroding. See R. Rein-
hold, New President Is Chosen at M.I.T.; He Warns of U.S. Technology Lag, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 5. This can partly be attributed to the fact that expenditures for
research and development, which amounted to 3% of the gross national product in the mid-
1960's, has decreased to a little more than 2%. Stone, supra note 59, at 79. See also Better
Prospects for Our Ailing Productivity, FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 1979, at 68.
61. Moreover, the true cost of oil dependency is not necessarily limited to economic
cost. See, e.g., Burt, Iraq Said To Get A-Bomb Ability With Italy's Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1980, at 1, col. 6; The Mideast Arms Race is Turning Nuclear, BusiNEss WEEK, Apr. 14,
1980 at 55.
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ment could provide the capital directly, it should not generally do
so. 6 2 Therefore, the needed capital must be derived from the pri-
vate sector through such devices as the reinvestment of corporate
profits, and debt and equity financing."3 This raises the issue of
whether we have a sufficient rate of capital formation to satisfy
our needs. The consensus is that we do not." The influential Joint
Economic Committee of Congress6 6 noted that "if no new steps are
taken to address the problem of structural unemployment, lagging
capital formation and a slow-down in productivity, then the Amer-
ican economy faces a bleak future. ' 67 All these problems are re-
lated; increased investment improves productivity, thus lowering
costs, slowing inflation and making our goods more competitive.5
62. It is likely that direct governmental contribution would involve the creation of addi-
tional federal bureaucracy. It is generally felt that government is less efficient and achieves
poorer results than private industry. See generally Comment, Providing Municipal Services
in New York State: The "Private Contract" Alternative, 28 BUFFALO L. Rav. 589 (1979);
Private Service of Public Needs Sought in Cities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1979, § A, at 1, col.
1. Government could provide capital indirectly, either through tax incentives or by insuring
the development of projects such as the synthetic fuel program. It is felt that private com-
panies would refuse to risk the required billions on untried technology, and that without a
guaranteed price, their infant industry could be eliminated by world wide market forces. See
generally Fuels for America's Future, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP. Aug. 13, 1979, at 32.
Whether the government should assist troubled companies is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. For two different views, see Pro and Con, Should Taxpayers Bail out Chrysler?, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 26, 1979, at 99.
63. Office of Economic Research, The New York Stock Exchange, Building a Better
Future: Economic Choices for the 1980s at 26 (Dec. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Exchange
Study]. This study is an analysis of the economy of the 1980s that is based on a sophisti-
cated mathematical model of the economy developed by the Wharton Econometric Fore-
casting Associates, Inc., under the direction of Professor Lawrence Klein. It develops projec-
tions of the likely overall consequences of three alternative courses national economic policy
could take in the decade ahead---"pessimistic," "status quo" and "optomistic."
64. "In its simplest terms, capital formation means the creation of productive capacity
from funds built up by businesses and individuals." Worry for Industry: Where To Get
Money to Keep Growing, U.S. N.ws & WORLD RaP., July 14, 1975, at 23.
65. See id.; Cruikshank, Capital Shortage May Shortchange Development, NATION's
BusiNEss, Apr., 1979, at 84; Insufficient Capital Formation, USA TODAY, Feb., 1979, at 8;
Showdown at Capital Gap, FORBES, Jan. 7, 1970, at 38 [hereinafter cited as Showdown]. But
see Waill, The Capital Shortage-A False Alarm, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, at 14, col. 3.
66. See Rattner, Joint Economic Panel's New Thrust, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1980, § D,
at 1, col. 1.
67. JOINT ECONOMIC CoMMrrr, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OUTLOOK 1980's 2
(Aug., 1979) (Summary of Midyear Report & Staff Study) [hereinafter cited as OUTLOOK].
68. See Shabecoff, Mr. Productivity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 3 at 9, col. 1.
Mr. Grayson, former chairman of President Nixon's Price Commission and
former dean of the Tulane and Southern Methodist University schools of busi-
ness, turned his back on government and academia several years ago to carry the
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Indeed, the Committee referred to productivity as the "linchpin"
of economic progress in the 1980's."9
It is estimated that for the economy "to perform at even mini-
mally acceptable levels in the 1980's, U.S. capital requirements will
be enormous-$1.8 trillion (in 1972 dollars). ' 70 This is significantly
higher than capital requirements in the 1970's;71 due in part to an
word of economic salvation around the country. That word was productivity. At
first, few listened. But now Mr. Grayson finds that his mission is no longer re-
garded as quixotic.
Productivity-or output per worker-is a key measure of economic health.
When it grows, the economy grows in real terms and so do standards of living.
When it goes down, real economic growth slows or stagnates.
To ask Mr. Grayson why productivity is so important is to open a floodgate.
"It is a key variable at work in reducing - or increasing - inflation," he
said. "To increase productivity is the best way to fight unemployment. We have
the statistics to show that higher productivity produces more jobs. The higher
the growth of productivity the more resources there are for health services, edu-
cation and fighting pollution."
Mr. Grayson added that sustained productivity growth is necessary for
United States' industry to meet rising foreign competition. "If we don't improve
our growth rate we will lose jobs and market positions to other countries."
Whatever the reasons for the decline, there is much to be done to improve
productivity, Mr. Grayson said. Government "must remove disincentives" to in-
vestment and to research and development.
It must also take steps to stimulate capital investment and savings. Costs and
benefits of regulation must improve productivity in its own operations."
Id. at col. 1, 2, 3.
69. OUTLOOK, supra note 67, at 1. Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
We don't see how anyone can quarrel with the JEC's conclusions. The facts
and figures certainly don't. Productivity growth in the private business sector
was three times greater over the 1947-65 period than during 1973-78. There's no
mystery about the reason for the shocking decline. Economists have traditionally
stressed the importance of capital investment to increasing productivity, and "in
recent years capital investment has not kept pace with employment." Inflation
and regulation have eaten up a sizeable chunk of investment capital and reduced
after-tax rates of return."
Id.
70. Exchange Study, supra note 63, at 3. "The 'base case' projects non-residential fixed
investment at a staggering $1.8 trillion (in 1972 dollars) in the decade of the 1980s. This is
what corporations will have to spend on replacement, modernization and expansion of the
productive capital stock." Id. at 26. "The 'optimistic' scenario points to even higher
needs-$120 billion of net new equity financing and $1.1 trillion of new debt financing." Id.
at 26 n. 27. See also Worry for Industry: Where to Get Money to Keep Growing, supra note
64, at 23, where estimates ranging from 3.8 trillion to 4.5 trillion dollars were reported.
71. Exchange Study, supra note 63, at 26, which estimates a 50% increase in capital
requirements, in constant dollars, for the eighties over the seventies.
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expanded population, inflation, 2 and the antiquated condition of
much of our plant and equipment, which must be replaced or re-
paired.7 3 The costs of environmental and pollution control stan-
dards7 4 also significantly contribute to this increase.7 5
Historically, 48% of all outlays for plant and equipment in the
United States has been financed from retained earnings, with the
remaining 52% from debt and equity financing. 76 Of the 52% from
debt/equity financing, approximately 90% has been derived from
debt offerings. Assuming that the $1.8 trillion in fixed investment
is adequate and the historical rates continue, the capital needs of
the 1980's will be approximately financed as follows:
Source of New Capital Amount Percentage
Retained Earnings 864 billion 48.0%
Debt Financings 842 billion 46.8%
Equity Financings 94 billion 5.2%
TOTAL 1.8 trillion 100.0%
Of course, a more optimistic outlook would require even greater
amounts of capital from these three sources. Aided by these statis-
tics, let us examine each source to see whether it will meet the
demands of the near future.
Whether retained earnings will continue to satisfy its histori-
cal contribution of 48% of the capital requirements of the 1980's is
72. Inflation adds to the increase because to replace tomorrow the same item purchased
yesterday costs more.
73. See "The net effect of takeovers is positive", FORBES, June 11, 1979, at 65. "The
average age of all U.S. plant and equipment is 171/2 years vs. under 12 years for West Ger-
many and under 10 years for Japan. Nearly two-thirds of our factories are 28 years old or
more. Only British plants are older, among major developed economies." Id. at 66. Indeed,
"[o]ver the past ten years the U.S. spent 13.5% of GDP on plant and equipment while
Britain spent 14.9%, France 16.7%, West Germany 17.4% and Japan 26.4%." Id.
74. See Stone, supra note 59, at 79: It has been estimated that "10 percent of the funds
that are being spent for new plant and equipment are required simply to meet new pollu-
tion-control standards." See also Quarles, A Thicket of Environmental Laws, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 24, 1979, at 10, col. 4; Brody, Orphan Ante: Cleaning Up Abandoned Chemical Dumps
Will Cost Billions, BARRON'S, Jan. 28, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
75. Furthermore, developing new energy sources, including synthetic energy, will add
billions to the capital requirements of the past. See Fuels for America's Future, supra note
62, at 32. See also Lyons, U.S. Details Gasahol Program, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1980, at 27,
col. 6. "The Carter program, which has taken 18 months to draft, envisions the use of be-
tween $8.5 billion and $13 billion over 11 years to spur production of ethanol with the aim
that by the mid 1980s about 2 billion gallons of ethanol a year will be produced." Id.
76. See Exchange Study, supra note 63, at 26.
77. Id.
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speculative. If slippage should occur in retained earnings, either
because of lower earnings or a higher payout ratio, then an even
greater contribution must be made by new equity investment.78
Such slippage is indeed a possibility.79 Furthermore, a greater pro-
portionate contribution from retained earnings may not be desira-
ble. By encouraging equity buildup through retained earnings
(which avoids the double taxation of dividends) rather than by
new issues of stock, our present tax system biases "the allocation
of capital in favor of those firms that are already earning income
and against new businesses." 80 Moreover, favorable tax treatment
of retained earnings "may also be a major cause of corporate merg-
ers and takeovers." 81
In examining the historical 52 % capital contribution furnished
by debt/equity funding, we find that choosing between the two al-
ternatives, a corporation invariably prefers to incur new debt. The
existing financial ratios indicate that new debt is favored nine to
one over equity financing.8 2 This situation exists because borrowed
capital is cheaper, since the interest cost is tax deductible, and be-
cause the leveraged profits resulting from low equity capitalization
are shared by fewer shareholders, thus maximizing earnings per
share. Conversely, dividends are not tax deductible" and addi-
78. This is so because total equity, which consists of retained earnings plus contributed
capital, must remain high in order to maintain relatively low debt/equity capitalization ra-
tios. See the discussion of capitalization ratios, notes 89-92 infra and accompanying text.
The current mix of debt/equity financing could severely limit future economic
expansion. High debt/equity ratios may have contributed already to the slow-
down in capital spending by raising risk premiums. The effect of increased risk
due to large debt positions is difficult to quantify. However, non-residential fixed
investment (in 1972 dollars) increased by 5.3% per year during 1958-1968....
Undoubtedly, some investment projects were abandoned because the overhang
of debt made further borrowing to finance new projects imprudent.
Exchange Study, supra note 63, at 23, 26.
79. See Miller, S.E.C. Chief Calls Profits Inadequate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1979, at 27,
col. 2. See also The Death of Equities, BusiNEss WEEK, Aug. 13, 1979, at 54. ("[G]ains in
profits are largely illusory because inflation makes them look rosier than they actually are.
And because plant and equipment are depreciated at historic cost rather than replacement
price, money that should go into capital investing and inventory purchasing instead goes to
the government in taxes." Id. at 55-56).
80. 124 CONG. REc. H640 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
81. Id. Presumably, retained earnings would improve liquidity and increase book value
while keeping the number of equity shares low, thus making the firm an attractive candidate
for acquisition.
82. See Exchange Study, supra note 63, at 26.'
83. See B. BrrrKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 39, at 1 5.04. On the other hand:
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tional common stock often results in a diminution of earnings per
share.
Why, therefore, doesn't industry borrow all of its capital needs
not satisfied by retained earnings? The answer lies in a common
sense rule of the marketplace that a reasonable amount of equity
(the aggregate of invested capital and retained earnings) is re-
quired for each new layer of debt. The rationale behind this un-
written rule is that the prospective lender, who receives only a
fixed rate of return, will insist that expansion also be funded by
equity money. Thus if the projected profits do not materialize,
shareholders' contributions will support the loan. Otherwise the
lender would be foolishly assuming all the risk.
Capitalization ratios"4 vary. When the proportion of debt rela-
§ 247 grants a limited deduction for dividends paid by public utility corporations
on certain preferred stock. This exception to the general rule that dividends are
not deductible by the paying corporation was enacted in 1942, in response to
testimony that regulatory restrictions on the issuance of debt by public utilities
would make expansion to meet war demands difficult, and that a deduction for
dividends paid on preferred stock would make it easier to attract equity capital.
Id.
84. Capitalization consists of the long term capital for each company, namely, long
term borrowings, common and preferred stock. See Independent Appraisals, FINANCIAL
WORLD, Jan. 1, 1980, at 61. Capitalization ratios, therefore, reflect the proportionate part of
a company's capitalization that is contributed by each of these three components. For
example:
Amount Capitalization Ratio
Bonds $3,000,000 30%
Preferred Stock 1,000,000 10%
Common Stock 6,000,000 60%
(including capital
surplus and retained
earnings)
TOTAL $10,000,000 100%
Desirable capitalization ratios are well known and fairly standard. Generally
speaking, it is considered desirable for an industrial company to have no more
than a 25% bond ratio, and for the common stock ratio to be at least as much as
the total of the bond and preferred stock ratios. If these proportions are not
maintained, a company may find it difficult to raise new capital.
MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMrTH, INC., HOW TO READ A FINANCIAL REPORT 24 (New
ed. Dec., 1964). Moreover:
A one-stock capitalization may be attractive because there are no prior
claims ahead of the common stock. But there may be an advantage in using
senior securities provided the funds borrowed can earn more than is needed to
pay the interest on debt or dividends on the preferred stock. Long-term debt
and preferred stock add what is called "leverage" to a company's capital struc-
ture. The degree of leverage is the percentage of the common stock and surplus
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tive to equity increases, borrowing costs are higher and credit is
less available . 5 As a practical matter, therefore, this is why compa-
nies, although mindful of the leverage and tax benefits of debt
financing, repeatedly seek more expensive equity capital before
floating additional debt financings."' This has been particularly
true in the utility industry, which annually requires vast sums of
money to finance expansion and has often issued common stock
below its historical book value. 7
Equity funding's historical 5.2% share8" of newly raised capi-
tal may seem unimportant. Yet, it assumes enormous significance
when one considers its irreplaceable contribution to overall share-
holders' equity, essential in maintaining healthy capitalization ra-
tios in financing future growth.89 Indeed, equity funding's share
should be increased,90 for American industry is already too heavily
committed to debt financings with its burdensome and inflexible
fixed charges continuing to accrue even during recessionary peri-
to the total capitalization. After paying fixed charges and preferred dividends,
increased earnings benefit the common stock. Therefore, leverage is an advan-
tage to the common stockholders while earnings are increasing. But a high de-
gree of leverage may be dangerous if a company's earnings are irregular or it is
engaged in a cyclical industry. For industrial companies, a rough maximum for
bonds and preferred stocks is that they should not exceed 50% of the total
capitalization.
The smaller the year-to-year fluctuations in earnings, the larger the amount
of senior securities outstanding may be without incurring danger. That is why
electric and gas utility companies may properly have a 25-30% common-stock
equity (ratio of common stock and surplus to total capitalization) whereas this
would be considered undesirable for a meatpacking or steel company, or a rail-
road. A 50%common-stock equity is generally regarded as a minimum for a
manufacturing or retail business.
THE NE w YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 15(n.d.) (with
data as of Sept. 15, 1971).
85. See Elia, New Debt Needed to Fuel Economy Is So Vast, Study Says, It Will
Crowd Out Equity Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 39, col. 3. It has been noted that the
increasing debt to equity ratios of United States corporations have resulted in "increased
risk and decreased flexibility in the course of business cycles." Evaluaton, supra note 50, at
597.
86. The companies today selling at below book value and far below replacement value
are far too numerous to mention. See, e.g., Norman Weinger's triple sixes, FoRsS, Dec. 10,
1979, at 129. See also The Return of Benjamin Graham, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1979, at 158.
87. See Cowan, Vepco's Litany of Troubles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1980, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
Historical book value is generally far below replacement cost.
88. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
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ods. A balance sheet too severely leveraged in favor of debt often
leads to illiquidity and ultimately bankruptcy.9 1
The next issue to consider, therefore, is who will supply ap-
proximately $94 billion (5.2% of $1.8 trillion) of new equity financ-
ing that is required to sustain minimal growth in the 19801s. 12 The
origin of this new equity capital is as essential to future economic
growth as the capital itself: it could determine who gains control of
various corporate enterprises. In recent times, ownership of Ameri-
can companies has been shifting from individual nationals to insti-
tutions and foreigners, a trend that portends special dangers and
problems.9 3 There are many reasons for the burgeoning of foreign
investment in the United States." For example, the weakness of
the dollar in comparison to foreign currencies 5 has made our se-
curities inexpensive to foreign investors. Our nation also offers po-
litical stability and thus is a safe haven for vast amounts of funds.
Moreover, many of our securities are presently selling below their
historical book value and far below replacement costs.96 In sum-
mary, buying depressed American securities with deflated dollars is
viewed as a very inexpensive entry into the American market-
place.9 This influx of foreign funds into United States equity se-
curities has been across-the-board, and more recently it has re-
sulted in actual takeovers of American companies.9 8
91. See Malabre, Jr., Debt Grows at Same Pace as Postwar Economy, but Spur in
Private Borrowing Worries Some, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1980, at 48, col. 1; Malabre, Jr.,
Dangerous Debt, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
92. See.text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
93. See Who Owns American Industry? The Big Shifts Under Way, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 18, 1977, at 70. See also The Case of the Vanishing Investor, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1974, § 6, at 14; Drinkhall & Guyon, supra note 10; Prendergast, New Laws Send
Message to Foreign Investors in Land, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 25, col. 1. But see
Stone, Danger of Foreign Takeover, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REP., July 9, 1979, at 72.
94. See Who Owns American Industry? The Big Shifts Under Way, supra note 93, at
70: "Foreign ownership of American stocks has also increased dramatically, from only 3.1
percent of the total value of shares outstanding in 1970 to 6.4 percent."
95. In recent months, the dollar has been temporarily strengthening in world markets,
principally because of the exhorbitant heights to which interest rates have risen in the
United States as a result of the government's attempt to arrest inflation. See, e.g., Dollar
Reaches 20 - Year High; Gold's Price Slips, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
96. See notes 86-87 supra.
97. An additional attraction is that non-resident aliens are often not taxed on their
capital gains. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2), which provides for taxation of non-resident alien indi-
viduals who are "present in the United States for a period or periods aggregating 183 days
or more during the taxable year. . . ." Id.
98. Foreign Investments Up in U.S., N.Y. Times, July 30, 1979, § 4 at 1, col. 6; Rout,
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Although foreign investment on a limited scale should be en-
couraged,9 our nation must become increasingly sensitive to its
presence.100 While United States investment overseas is nearly four
times as great as direct foreign investment in this country, the lat-
ter is growing at a much faster rate.10 1 We should carefully monitor
the growth of foreign investment.10 2 This is particularly true when
one considers the great increase of federal debt in foreign hands. In
1970, 5% of the publicly held federal debt was held by foreigners.
This amount has risen to 20%, approximately $121 billion. 03 In
fact, "[a]lmost half of all the new federal debt to have gone into
private hands in the last decade has gone to foreigners."''
As equally disturbing as foreign investment is the vast concen-
tration of American equity securities in the hands of institutions
such as banks, trust companies, insurance companies, pensions and
supra note 10; The Buying of America: How Much of Ours is Theirs?, N.Y. Daily News,
Mar. 5, 1979, at 5, col. 1; The Buying of America: The Invasion of the Giants, N.Y. Daily
News, Mar. 6, 1979, at 31, col. 1; Why Foreign Investors Put Their Money on U.S., U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., July 9, 1979, at 29. The list of companies involved is long, and their
names are well known. See The Buying of America: How Much of Ours is Theirs?, N.Y.
Daily News, supra this note.
Among the most familiar names that changed citizenship last year were Yale
locks, Peter Paul candy, Lum's restaurants, United Artists records, Browning
shotguns, and Budd Co., probably best known for its railway cars.
What is most astonishing is how little most Americans know about this
multi-billion dollar foreign invasion.
Consider only the New York area names that are under full or pending con-
trol of foreign companies-Gimbes, Saks Fifth Avenue, Korvettes, Bankers
Trust Co., Grand Union, FAO Schwartz, Ups 'n Downs boutiques, Marine Mid-
land, Ohrbachs, Anne Klein fashions, A & P - and a whole Yellow Pages index
more.
Id. See also Wiggins, Nest& to Acquire Beech-Nut Foods, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1979, § D,
at 1, col. 3.
99. See Stone, supra note 93.
100. See Address by Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, quoted in THE WEK IN REviEw, June 22, 1979, at 4.
101. See Who Owns American Industry? The Big Shifts Under Way, supra note 93.
See also Foreign investors in the U.S.-the pace quickens, FORBES, Apr. 2, 1979, at 73.
102. See Why Foreign Investors Put Their Money on U.S., supra note 98. Jones,
Should U.S. Curb Investing by Foreigners?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1975, at 49, col. 1.
103. See Washington Whispers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1979, at 18.
104. Vogl, The U.S. Gets Deeper in Debt to Foreigners, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1979, § 3,
at 3, col. 1. See Feldstein & Griffin, Social security hobbles our capital formation, HARv.
Bus. REV., July-Aug., 1979, at 6, which suggests that "the lack of domestic saving may en-
courage a growing inflow of foreign investment and ownership in the United States [and]
the scarcity of capital and the inflow of foreign funds may encourage an increase in govern-
ment controls over the capital markets." Id. at 7.
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foundations. This raises concerns about the potential dominance of
some of the largest companies in America." 5 In addition, such a
concentration 06  creates a problem of illiquidity in the
marketplace. 107
105. Elia, Broader Disclosure of Institutional Holdings Likely to Rekindle Concern
Over Dominance, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1979, at 47, col. 3.
In a few cases, holdings of foundations distort the picture. For example,
71.4% of the stock of Kellogg is in institutional hands but a large portion of this
is foundation-held.
But the same can't be said for some other stocks largely held by the reporting
institutions. For example, a surprisingly high 71.2% of Digital Equipment stock
is held by these institutional investors; the stock was in 153 portfolios at year-
end.
International Business Machines, the most widely held issue, was held by 363
institutions at year-end. They accounted for $19.1 billion, or 43.9% of the stock
outstanding in the giant computer manufacturer.
The nine next largest dollar holdings were Exxon, 36.5% by 344 institutions;
American Telephone & Telegraph, 18.7% by 342; General Electric, 37.6% by
309; Minnesota Mining 54.4% by 265; Eastman Kodak, 35.6% by 303; General
Motors, 21.3% by 288; Schlumberger, 39.2% by 253; Standard Oil (Calif.), 36%
by 264; and Atlantic Richfield, 48.6% by 274.
Among other major stocks owned 50% or more by the institutions were
Philip Morris, Xerox, Eli Lilly (includes a foundation), Halliburton, Burroughs,
Smith-Kline, Avon, K-mart, Deere, McDonald's, American Express, Texas In-
struments, Revlon, Alcoa, Schering-Plough, Raytheon, General Mills, Baxter-
Travenol, Travelers, Upjohn, Motorola, General Reinsurance, Anheuser-Busch,
AMP and American Broadcasting.
Id., col. 4. See also Trust-Busting?, FoRBEs, July 1, 1974, at 54; Who Owns American Indus-
try? The Big Shifts Under Way, supra note 93.
106. Excessive ownership concentration in any market has its troublesome aspects. See,
e.g., Arenson, More Silver Pressure is Feared, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 6;
Miller, Silver's Impact on Markets, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 6.
107. See McKenna, Wall Street and the Small Investor: They Need Him, Can They
Woo Him Back?, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 16, 1973, at 38, col. 1. See also Hooper, What About
the Individual Investor?, FoRBEs, June 1, 1973, at 73; Loomis, How the Terrible Two-Tier
Market Came to Wall Street, FORTUNE, July 1973, at 82.
To many businessmen the stock market this year has seemed inexplicable,
about as bizarre, say, as Watergate. The market has ignored the large, and often
sensational, earnings gains being reported by corporations, and has gone relent-
lessly down. More than that, it has gone down with a great unevenness, much as
a giant popover might lose steam.
On the one hand, the prices and price-earnings ratios of a few dozen institu-
tional favorites-known around as "the Vestal Virgins"-have fallen only mod-
erately .... In contrast, the great majority of stocks have sunk to levels that
suggest they have become virtual pariahs. In the early months of this year, Wall
Street was already talking about a "two-tier market" of remarkable proportions.
By May, stocks that had seemed cheap at March prices had collapsed still fur-
ther-many to levels of four or five times expected 1973 earnings-and the situ-
ation was being described as unique in stockmarket history.
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Thus, when the large sums of equity capital are raised in the
next decade, steps must be taken to insure that the role of individ-
ual citizens of the United States is increased.10 s The problem is
how to encourage such individuals to make equity commitments.
Part of the reason for the lack of equity investments by individuals
is that personal savings in the United States "are falling short of
past performance, and are well below what the U.S. principal Free
World competitors-Japan, West Germany, Canada and the
U.K.-are saving now." 109 Several reasons have been advanced for
this lack of frugality,1 0 but the principal culprit is lack of tax in-
centives.""' The United States is a nation where consumption in-
... The basic questions concern the country's capital markets, which have in
the past demonstrated an outstanding ability to deliver equity capital to a broad
range of companies. The two-tier market suggests, however, that the range is
narrowing and the universe in which investors are willing to sink their money is
shrinking. If this situation persists, how are the great majority of companies to
raise the equity capital they may need? Beyond that, what happens to the new
company seeking equity capital the first time? Optimistic answers to these ques-
tions are hard to come by.
Id. at 82-83. For further discussion about the impact of institutional investments on the
securities market, see Russo & Wang, The Structure of the Securities Market-Past and
Future, 41 FORDHAm L. RE V. 1, 1-2 (1972).
108. See The Death of Equities, supra note 79.
At least 7 million shareholders have defected from the stock market since
1970, leaving equities more and more than ever the province of giant institu-
tional investors. And now the institutions have been given the go-ahead to shift
more of their money from stocks-and bonds-into other investments. If the
institutions, who control the bulk of the nation's wealth, now withdraw billions
from both the stock and bond markets, the implications for the U.S. economy
could not be worse. Says Robert S. Salomon Jr., a general partner in Salomon
Bros.: "We are running the risk of immobilizing a substantial portion of the
world's wealth in someone's stamp collection."
Id. at 54.
109. Showdown, supra note 65. See also The net effect of takeovers is positive, supra
note 73, at 65 ("[T]he U.S. savings rate is dangerously low. 6.7% over the past five years vs.
14.1% for Britain, 15.2% for West Germany and 24.9% for Japan."); Allan, Thrift Adrift:
Why Nobody Saves, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 5.
110. One of the reasons is the expectations that old age benefits such as social security
and pensions will make savings unnecessary. See Felstein & Griffin, supra note 104. See also
Showdown, supra note 65, at 41.
111. See Showdown, supra note 65 at 39:
In the U.S. there is no tax break on savings account interest and only a mod-
est break on dividend income-there is a $200 exclusion on a joint return. In
Japan, interest on up to $32,000 of savings is exempt and dividends are taxed at
a reduced rate. In West Germany, most dividends and $300 of interest (on a
joint return) are tax free. Canada exempts the first $2,000 of interest and divi-
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stead of savings is encouraged.
In the 1960s the question was whether America could afford both Vietnam
and the Great Society-guns or butter. We chose to have guns and butter,
and wound up with guns, butter and inflation. As we enter the 1980s, we're
told we need more capital for industry. But that capital will have to come
from somewhere, meaning someone will have to sacrifice something. As we
found in the Sixties, there is no free lunch-or a free war. Just as we couldn't
really have guns and butter, neither can we have both more investment and a
continuation of the consumer spending spree that has marked the past few
years.
112
This situation will recur in the 1980's because the "cold war"
possibilities require increases in defense expenditures.11 This in
turn will increase the federal deficit, straining our credit markets,
and further aggravating inflation. Productivity gains achieved
through increased investment, however, will decrease these infla-
tionary pressures.114
dends (on a joint return). Even in the U.K., not known for encouraging capital
formation, interest on savings certificates is exempt, as is the first $140 of inter-
est from National Savings Bank accounts.
The antisavings bias in the U.S. tax code is bad enough, but the pro-con-
sumption bias is even worse. The consumption incentive is so deeply ingrained
that no one seems to notice it anymore. The incentive is allowing people filing
itemized returns to deduct from taxable income every penny of interest paid.
Our competitors penalize wealth by assessing wealth taxes, but none of our com-
petitors subsidizes consumer spending by allowing individuals to deduct all their
interest expense. In West Germany and Canada, no interest deductions are al-
lowed to individuals. Japan and the U.K. have only limited deductions for mort-
gage interest. None of these countries allows consumer loan interest to be
deducted.
112. Id. at 43. The Joint Economic Committee, in its midyear review of the economy,
beckons Americans to shift attention to the supply side of the economy, to save more, invest
more, and train more of the disadvantaged to assume their rightful roles in the workplaces
of America. See Outlook, supra note 67. See also Stone, supra note 59, at 80.
113. See, e.g., Halloran, Military: Carter Wants Increase in 1981 And Steady Rises
Over Next 5 Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1980, § 2, at 10, col. 1; Levine, Budget Battle,
Congress May Push Up Carter's Proposed Rise in Military Spending, Wall St. J., Jan. 29,
1980, at 1, col. 6. For an example of the magnitude of the anticipated increase, see To-
morrow, A Look Ahead From the Nation's Capital, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4, 1980,
at 11, where a defense bill of 257 billion dollars is projected for 1985. This estimate assumes
a 5.5% real annual increase in spending and 9% annual inflation.
114. For the relationship between capital formation, productivity and inflation, see
notes 59 & 69 supra and accompanying text. See also Productivity: Only Real Cure for
Inflation?, U.S. NEws & Wom REP., Mar. 12, 1979, at 80. Unfortunately, for the full year,
productivity fell .9% in 1979, making last year only the second time in thirty-two years that
such a decline was registered, Productivity Off Again in 4th Quarter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1980, § D, at 1, col. 3, and productivity is not expected to increase in 1980. See Productivity
Fell At Rate of 1.6% In The 4th Period, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
CORPORATE PROFITS
An examination of the returns on other liquid investments"15
illustrates a second reason why individuals do not purchase equity
securities. Investors can receive double-digit returns on certificates
of deposit, corporate bonds and Treasury issues.1 6 Holders of deep
discount bonds117 can also reap significant capital gains profits if
the bonds are held until maturity.118 Furthermore, the yield from
Treasury issues is usually shielded from local income tax levies.119
Moreover, the record yields of municipal securities are attractive to
tax conscious investors who realize that a secure 7 % yield is
equivalent to a 15% taxable return to a 50 % bracket taxpayer and
a 25% taxable return to a 70% bracket taxpayer. 120
There is little wonder why investors shun equity invest-
ments.121 First of all, the average yield on common stock is signifi-
cantly below both that of the pretax yield of the money instru-
ments mentioned above and the posttax yield of municipal
securities. 2 In addition, unless an investment is substantial, bro-
115. Investments in real estate and retirement plans are not considered as liquid op-
tions herein because they are usually long term commitments and generally acquired for
personal reasons (as with one's residence) or in the course of employment (as with pen-
sions). In any event, liberal tax incentives make both of these investments attractive. For a
residence, the taxes and mortgage interest are currently deductible, I.R.C. §§ 164, 163, and
in the event of sale, the recognition of any gain might either be deferred, when a replace-
ment residence is purchased, or permanently excluded, up to $100,000, in the event the
taxpayer is 55 years or older at the time of sale. As to retirement plans, no gain is usually
recognized to the employee upon contribution thereto, I.R.C. § 402(a), and a tax-free treat-
ment of fund growth is assured until employee retirement, I.R.C. § 501(a).
116. See Big Yields You Can Get on Your Money Now, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct.
29, 1979, at 82; Vartan, Bond Yields Climb to Peak Level, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, § D, at
1, col. 6. Yields on Treasury Bills Surge to a Record 17 %, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1980, §
D, at 1, col. 4.
117. The term "deep discount" refers to a bond selling at a significant discount from its
face value either because of a slippage in the credit worthiness of the issuer, or because the
coupon rate is far below the yields currently available on newly issued bonds.
118. See, e.g., Ella, Strategist Looks to Deeply Discounted Bonds for Potential Big
Gain, but Another is Wary, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1980, at 35, col. 3.
119. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120. See Morner, The Case For Buying Municipals, FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 1979, at 135. See
also Vartan, M.A.C. Bonds To Yield 9.10%, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1980, § D, at 9, col. 4.
121. See The Death of Equities, supra note 79. To the extent a capital gains tax en-
courages investments, see notes 165-168, infra and accompanying text.
122. The current pretax yield on common stocks has been hovering around 6% for in-
dustrials, 5% for transportation and 83 % for utility issues. See Barron's Market Labora-
tory, BARRON'S, Jan. 28, 1980, at 94, col. 2, 3. Although yields on straight preferred shares
are generally higher than those on common, thus helping tilt capitalization ratios in favor of
equity over debt, corporations are hesitant to issue such shares because the preferred divi-
dend yield must be somewhat comparable to that on debt, without the advantage of a de-
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kers' commissions could virtually erase the current yield unless the
stock appreciates in value. 123
The ultimate question is whether tax incentives, such as the
elimination of the double tax on dividends, will induce the addi-
tional commitment to equity investment that is essential to future
growth. Logically, more persons will choose an investment if its af-
ter tax yield increases.2 4 In the meantime, while economists and
duction as is the case with interest expense. But see I.R.C. § 116(a), which offers up to a
$100 exclusion ($200 on a joint return) for dividends received by an individual from a do-
mestic corporation. This exclusion has been increased and amended to include interest in-
come by Pub. L. No. 96-223 (1980). See note 178 infra.
123. Of course, there is always the fear that the stock value will fall. It should be noted
that in the case of individual taxpayers, capital losses are generally limited to capital gains
plus $3,000, I.R.C. § 1211(b), whereas capital gains are usually fully taxable when realized,
I.R.C. § 451(a).
124. See generally text accompanying notes 129-134, infra concerning shareholder
credit relief techniques. For an interesting observation of stockholder, reaction to tax incen-
tives, see Let Them Buy Stocks, FORBES, Dec. 25, 1978, at 32.
All over France, viewers tune in nightly at 8:30 for a prime-time adventure
film. But first come the commercials, which run in a solid ten-minute block pre-
ceding the action. In the final spot, money rattles into a cash-box. A map of la
patrie throbs to the sound of amplified heartbeats. "Invest in French industry,"
the voice-over intones in a patriotic spiel aimed at selling common stocks.
This is the Gallic equivalent of Merrill Lynch's thundering herd. The spon-
sor? The French government promoting "Shares-Today's Way to Save." A
how-to mailing from the Treasury makes an even harder sell: "Pay less tax...
by becoming a shareholder" is its message. A nationwide ad campaign by banks
choruses the same line.
Behind all the hoopla is a new tax law enacted this July. It lets a Frenchman
who buys up to 5,000 francs ($1,200) worth of stock in French companies each
year for the next four years deduct that amount from his taxable income. For a
businessman with a $30,000 annual salary, the potential tax reduction is $2,000
over the full period.
The objective is to entice France's traditionally cautious small investors to
take their savings out of bank accounts or real estate holdings and put them in
common stocks. (Whereas 1 American in 9 is a shareholder, only 1 Frenchman in
35 is.) Investment professionals yawned when the government struck up this
capitalist tune, but they were soon wide awake and taking orders. When 1978
ends, over 1.5 million Frenchmen will have invested $1.5 billion in common
stocks through the plan. "Small investors who had never owned a share in their
lives have come in," says Jean-Jacques Netter of brokers Sellier, Suchet & Cie.
"They realize that even if they lose 40% of their investment they still get a good
deal because of the tax benefit."
Id. A plan similiar to France's is being studied in the United Kingdom because of its success
in France. See Ellington, Britons May Receive Tax Breaks To Boost Equities Investment,
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1980, at 12, col. 3. In addition, significantly greater amounts of venture
capital were raised following the reduction in capital gains tax contained in the Revenue Act
of 1978. See notes 166 & 167 infra and accompanying text.
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legislators fiddle with statistics, which are largely speculative or
meaningless because of variable or external influences,125 the
125. See Committee on Corporations, Section of Taxation, New York State Bar Ass'n,
Report on the Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37, 63
n.80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Association Report], which discusses the lack of empirical
evidence on the effect of integration of corporate and individual income taxes upon capital
formation and equities. This is hardly surprising, because, except for a brief trial with inte-
gration, we have had unrelieved double taxation of corporate profits since 1913. See note 48
supra. See also C. McLuRE, JR., MusT CORPORATE INcOME BE TAXED TWICE? 50-91 (1979),
which discusses the foreign experience with integration.
The experience of France, Germany and the United Kingdom with their respec-
tive tax integration schemes suggests that partial tax integration may not be an
effective mechanism for increasing the rate of capital accumulation by business.
In France and the United Kingdom dividend rates were not increased, and in
Germany, although the dividend rate seemingly was increased the proportion of
corporate capital financed by sales of corporate stock actually decreased. It is
true that in the United Kingdom potential dividend increases were held back by
external factors, i.e., the government's anti-inflation policy, rather than any in-
trinsic flaw in the imputation system itself. But the British experience indicates
that a policy to increase dividends may be viewed as inflationary or, at any rate,
as incompatible with an anti-inflation policy.
Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAW. 65, 82-83
(1977). On the other hand, even if dividends do not rise, the after-tax yield to the investor
does rise if his aggregate tax is lowered on such income. Increasing the stockholder's after-
tax yield might permit corporations to maintain dividends at their present levels, thus ena-
bling a greater reinvestment of increasing corporate profits. Such reinvestment increases
stockholder equity similarly to equity financings. Note, however, the warnings of Congress-
man Ullman that such retention may encourage mergers and takeovers. See note 81 supra
and accompanying text. See also (1977) 64 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 18 [hereinafter
cited as TAX POLICY], which discusses, inter alia, the brief United States experience on
integration.
U.S. Experience With Integration, 1936-38
1. In 1936 Congress enacted a split rate corporate income tax under which
income paid out as dividends was taxed at normal tax rates between 8 and 15
percent and retained earnings were taxed under a surtax, whose rates ranged
from 7 to 27 percent and were based on the fraction of earnings paid out as
dividends.
2. As might be expected, the existence of an additional progressive tax on
retained earnings encouraged a substantial increase in dividends. It has 'been
estimated that during the two years in which this was in effect (1936 and 1937),
dividend distributions were one-third greater as a result of this changed tax
treatment. Substantial inter-industry differences in increased payout occurred.
Manufacturing payout was 40 percent higher, while construction, forestry and
fisheries and agriculture paid out 75 percent more. Small and medium corpora-
tions had higher payout rates of dividends than did the larger firms as measured
by asset size. Apparently, the surtax on retained profits stimulated greater out-
lays to corporate employees and outlays for maintenance. Larger executive sala-
ries and bonuses enabled owners of small businesses to reduce corporate normal
taxes as well as to avoid the surtax.
3. In 1938 the undistributed profits surtax was repealed.
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American investor-the key to a healthy investment climate-has
emphatically delivered his message: present equity yields are inad-
equate to warrant his attention.126 Curiously, the United States is
the only leading industrial nation that imposes unrelieved double
taxation on corporate profits. 127 The time has come to eliminate
this dubious distinction.
HI. FORM OF TAX REIEF FOR CORPORATE PROFITS
Once a decision has been reached to alleviate the burden of
the double tax on corporate profits, choosing the form of relief is
no simple task. Although there are many possible ways to integrate
corporate and individual income taxes, integration can basically be
categorized as full or partial. Both methods will be briefly
discussed. 28
A. Full Integration
Full integration essentially affords the tax treatment currently
applicable to subchapter S corporations. 29 The corporate tax is
eliminated and corporate income is attributed directly to the
shareholders, whether distributed or not. "Thus all corporate-
source income would be taxed at the marginal tax rate applicable
to the shareholder in question,"130 and "[c]orporate losses would
presumably also be attributed to the shareholders."13' Further-
Id. at 16.
126. See The Death of Equities, supra note 79, at 54-55, which discusses the significant
decrease in the number of shareholders, particularly younger investors.
During the period 1973-1978 the individual investor who has remained in the
marketplace has shifted a significant portion of his investment funds away from
equities to high yield, fixed income investment. According to data compiled by
Salomon Brothers ... individual households, have been the net sellers of ap-
proximately $25 billion in equity securities over the last six years. During this
same period they have purchased over $216 billion in U.S. government and
agency securities, issues of bonds and other fixed income securities.
REPORT OF THE JOINT INDusTRY/GovERNMENT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BusINEss FINANCING, 22
(May 22, 1979).
127. See TAx POLICY, supra note 125.
128. For more thorough discussions of integration techniques, see Gourevitch, supra
note 125; McLure, supra note 49; Evaluation, supra note 50, at 595-620.
129. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
130. See McLure, supra note 49, at 550; Gourevitch, supra note 125, at 85 ("Under full
integration, the corporate tax can either be eliminated entirely or it can be retained as a
withholding tax of shareholders' individual income tax liabilities.").
131. See Evaluation, supra note 50, at 598.
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more, "the basis of corporate shares would be adjusted upward by
the income attributed to the shareholders and downward by corpo-
rate losses allowed to them and by distributions made to them. 18 2
Full integration, therefore, would eliminate a large source of capi-
tal gains to shareholders by taxing retained earnings as ordinary
income on an accrual rather than a realization basis.13 3
At first, full integration appears to be the simplest and most
equitable method of undoing double taxation. Unfortunately, this
is not true. For example, how are corporate preferences passed
through to the shareholder? "The character of income (for exam-
ple, tax exempt interest), accelerated depreciation, and an invest-
ment credit could not be passed on to millions of small sharehold-
ers of publicly-held corporations. The complexity of all of these
items in the tax returns of millions of small shareholders would be
overwhelming. 13 4 In addition, consider the unsettling administra-
tive effect on millions of shareholders' income tax returns that
132. Id.
133. In the foreward to U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX RE-
FORM (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS] former Secretary of the Treasury William Si-
mon stated:
I noted that we. need to return to the basic principles upon which our income
tax system was founded and the three cornerstones of its structure-equity, effi-
ciency and simplicity. I said we need to wipe the slate clean of personal prefer-
ences, special deductions and credits, exclusions from income and the like, and
impose a single, simple progressive tax on all individuals.
Comments on BLUEPRINTS, by the Special Committee on Simplification of the Section of
Taxation of the American Bar Association were favorable.
The Committee recommends consideration of full integration only as an ele-
ment of a massive revision of the United States income tax system, such as the
comprehensive income tax proposed by BLUEPRINTS. Unless the special treatment
of capital gains, the investment credit, accelerated depreciation, the exemption
of state and local bond interest, and all other such provisions were eliminated at
the same time, a fully integrated system would be more, rather than less, com-
plex. The adoption of such a full integration system would require a transition
period of ten years during which much of the complexity of existing law would
remain. The Committee seriously doubts that it is feasible to make such a
change in the United States and instead recommends that attention be focused
on partial integration.
If, however, the United States were to adopt a comprehensive income tax
base, low-rate system, as proposed by BLUEPRINTS, the Committee would favor
adoption of full integration. Integration would greatly facilitate adoption of such
a system, which would result in fundamental simplification of the income tax
structure.
Evaluation, supra note 50, at 604-05. See also, McLure, supra note 47, at 568-69.
134. Evaluation, supra note 50, at 600.
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would result from an audit of corporate profits.135 Moreover, full
integration might be unmanageable for corporations with several
types of stock, with different rights (for example, dividends, voting,
liquidation, convertibility, warrants and redemption). Indeed, allo-
cating corporate income among various shareholders could prove
difficult if not impossible. Further complications arise in the case
of a corporate shareholder who would be unable to calculate its
own earnings and thus allocate them to its shareholders until it
had been informed of its pro rata share of corporate profits.18,
Such reporting delays would be unacceptable in today's time-ori-
ented economy and tax structure.137
This view on the administrative feasibility of the partnership method seems
to have stood the test of time. In the one situationwhere the United States
tax system provides for partnership treatment of corporate income, sub-
chapter S for closely held corporations, administrability was preserved by the
two requirements that only one class of stock be issued, and that all share-
holders must be individuals.lu
Finally, consider corporations that retain a substantial part of
their earnings. It is likely that its shareholders will not have the
cash-flow necessary to meet personal tax liabilities on the portion
of undistributed corporate-source income allocated .to them. "This
is particularly telling in the case of widely-held corporations; divi-
dend policies are largely beyond the control of shareholders and
would probably continue to be so . . . ..
B. Partial Integration
In contrast to full integration, partial integration can be ap-
plied at either the corporate or shareholder level.140 Both partial
integration techniques reach only distributed earnings. 1 4 Relief is
135. Id. at 603.
136. See McLure, supra note 49, at 563.
137. Evaluation, supra note 50, at 602. Obviously the problem would be further exacer-
bated for corporate stockholders.
138. McLure, supra note 49, at 564. The use of the term partnership in this quote is
intended to describe the flow-through effects of full integration and, as such, is virtually
synonymous with the tax treatment afforded to subchapter S corporations. See note 35
supra and accompanying text.
139. McLure, supra note 49, at 564.
140. See id. at 89.
141. McLure, supra, note 49, at 561, which, in discussing feasible integration methods
rejects "those [techniques] that seem to be sufficiently defective from a conceptual stand-
point not to merit further discussion of their administrative feasibility: the simple elimina-
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granted at the corporate level either by allowing the corporation a
tax deduction for all or part of the dividends it pays, or by apply-
ing a lower corporate rate [hereinafter referred to as "split rate"]
to distributed earnings. "The dividend deduction and split rate
systems are identical in effect; a full deduction for dividends
merely applies a zero rate to distributed earnings, and a partial
deduction is equivalent to a lower rate on distributed earnings
than on retained earnings. "142 Partial integration at the share-
holder level [hereinafter referred to as "shareholder credit"] is
achieved by "treat[ing] all or part of the corporate tax deemed al-
locable to distributed earnings as an additional distribution for
which a credit is allowed against the shareholder's tax."143 This is
termed full credit and partial credit, respectively. The credit would
also be refundable, except possibly for tax exempt and foreign
shareholders. 44
Although there is some debate as to which partial integration
technique is preferable,1 45 a shareholder credit appears to be more
advantageous. "Most foreign countries with integration systems
have adopted the shareholder credit approach." 1"4e For this reason
tion of the corporation income tax, the dividend-received credit." Id.
142. See Evaluation, supra note 50, at 605.
143. Id.
144. See TAX POLICY, supra note 125, at 11:
Shareholders eligible for integration.-Another issue with significant reve-
nue effects is whether tax-exempt shareholders should be made eligible for inte-
gration. Tax-exempt organizations, pension funds and foreigners receive about
20 percent of all dividends (net of intercorporate dividends), but making them
eligible for integration would increase the revenue loss by about 50 pdrcent (that
is, the tax-exempt shareholders would receive one-third of the tax reduction
from integration). The reason the tax-exempt shareholders benefit dispropor-
tionately from integration is that for taxable shareholders, some of the share-
holder credit is "recaptured" by the gross-up, but there would be no gross-up for
tax-exempt shareholders. However, excluding tax-exempt shareholders from in-
tegration would reduce the beneficial effects of integration on corporate financial
structures and resource allocation. Whether foreign shareholders in U.S. corpo-
rations should be eligible for integration is an appropriate subject for tax treaty
negotiations.
145. See generally Gourevitch, supra note 125, at 84-94; Evaluation, supra note 50, at
607-15; McLure, supra note 49, at 562-81.
146. Evaluation, supra note 50, at 617. See also Gourevitch, supra note 125, at 89. The
reason for the preference for the shareholder credit system is explained in id. at 110-11.
("[U]nder such a system the tax credit granted to resident shareholders is automatically
denied to nonresident shareholders. This enables a tax credit country to negotiate from
strength if it is prepared to grant the tai credit to residents of another country through a
tax treaty.")
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alone, a shareholder credit is advantageous because "international
fiscal cooperation would be facilitated by our adoption of the same
method. ' 147 In addition, relief at the shareholder level would di-
rectly increase the after-tax yield of dividends, thus making equity
investments more attractive. 148
Under a full credit system, a shareholder's dividend plus the
corporate tax allocable to the dividend (grossup) is included in his
gross income. This combined figure, is taxed at the stockholder's
marginal rate, which is 70% or less. Deducted from the resultant
tax is a credit of 100% of the grossup. Since this 100% credit nec-
essarily exceeds the individual's marginal tax rate on the identical
grossup, the taxpayer's after tax yield is increased.149 Under a par-
tial credit system, the amount grossed up and later credited is ar-
tificially fixed at a flat percentage (for example, 10% of the divi-
dend), which bears no relation to the actual allocable taxes paid by
the distributing corporation on the income being distributed as a
dividend.
France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom have
adopted a tax credit system. 50 Of the four, however, only Germany
147. See McLure, supra note 49, at 582.
148. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
149. For an example of a full credit, see TAx POLICY, supra note 125, at 14:
Consider a corporation with $300 of book income. Under existing law, assume
its corporate tax liability is $100. Further assume that it now pays $150 in divi-
dends out of its $200 in after-tax income and retains $50. If the shareholders are
in the 40-percent bracket, they pay $60 in tax on their dividend so that the total
tax burden-corporate plus individual-is $160 ....
Assume that the corporation continues to pay a $150' dividend. Since this is
three-fourths of after-tax income, the corporate tax attributable to the dividend
would be $75 out of the $100 in overall corporate tax liability. The shareholders
would report income of $225 (the $150 dividend "grossed up" by the $75 in cor-
porate tax attributable to the dividend). The individual tax on this amount at a
40-j ercent rate is $90. The shareholders would claim a tax credit of $75 for the
corporate tax attributable to the dividends, so that their net individual tax
would be $15. The total tax burden would be $115 ($100 corporate tax plus $15
individual tax), a reduction of $45 from existing law..
Assume now that, in response to the elimination of the double tax on divi-
dends, the corporation raises its dividend from $150 to $180, so that retained
earnings fall to $20. Now, the corporate tax attributable to the dividend is $90.
Shareholders would report income of $270 ($180 in dividends grossed up by $90
in corporate tax attributable to the dividends), on which the individual tax is
$108. Since they would get a tax credit of $90, the net individual tax would be
$18, and the total burden would be $118, a tax cut of $42 from present law.
150. Id. at 16.
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gives resident shareholders a tax credit for the full amount of the
corporate tax borne by distributed income.151 A partial credit sys-
tem has recently been proposed in the United States. 52 Such a
system is easier to administer because the corporate tax paid does
not have to be allocated to the dividend distributed. Nevertheless,
from the perspective of inducing capital formation, a full credit
would be more favorable than a nominal partial credit because it
would make equity investments more attractive, at least initially,
by further increasing the after tax yields of dividends.
IV. POLMcAL REALITmS
Understandably, because 1980 is an election year, tax revision
proposals are a major topic of discussion. For the first time in de-
cades, much attention is directed toward tax relief measures that
induce production instead of consumption. Several proposals have
been suggested, including slowing the escalation of social security
taxes, indexing income tax rate brackets, liberalizing rules for de-
preciation deductions, extending the investment credit, reducing
capital gain tax rates, reforming the disparate taxation of divi-
dends, and granting limited exclusions for dividend and interest
income.153
151. Id. ("Japan uses a split corporate rate of 30 percent on dividends and 40 percent
on retained earnings, and it allows shareholders a tax credit equal to 10 percent of their
dividend income (with no gross up). The shareholder credit is 5 percent at higher income
levels.")
152. See 124 CONG. Rsc. H640 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
[S]hareholders would receive a tax credit equal to a percentage of their divi-
dend income-initially 10 percent but increasing over a 6 year period to 20 per-
cent. They would include this credit in their gross income. This shareholder
credit would, when fully phased-in eliminate almost 22 percent of the current
double tax on dividends .... I do not intend integration to be a substitute for
other corporate tax reductions or to be contingent on enactment of any offset-
ting tax increases. My integration program is designed to have a modest initial
revenue impact-about 1 V2 billion-so there is no need for any trade-offs.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 125 CONG. REc. E70 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. Pickle); Rep. Pickle's proposal would defer the tax on dividends that are reinvested in
a qualified investment plan. 125 CONG. Rxc. E581 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Pickle).
153. See Cowan, Taxes: 'Reform' Takes a Breather, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1979, § 3, at 1,
col. 3; Farnsworth, A Late Filing for Tax-Cut Plans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1980 (Nat'l Econ.
Survey), at 1, col. 1; Hyatt, S & L Industry Feels It Has a Good Chance Of Winning Inter-
est Tax Break This Fall, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1979, at 3, col. 2; Pierson, Business Groups
Units to Push New Law Giving Faster Write-Offs on Capital Assets, Wall St. J., Aug. 10,
1979, at 32, col. 1; Pierson & Levine, Lower Levies, Tax-Cut Fever Builds As Congressmen
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While each of these suggestions is intended to alleviate the
problem of capital shortfall, the enactment of one or more does not
render the others unnecessary; each serves capital formation in a
different way. For example, the recent increases in social security
taxes to both employer and employee, together with increases
scheduled for the future, deprive business of capital that could be
reinvested in expansion.'" Furthermore, these increases are partic-
ularly painful to employees, who pay the social security levy with
after tax dollars-what is left over after the government has al-
ready withheld income taxes. 15 5 These increasing social security
taxes necessarily diminish savings, and inhibit the capital forma-
tion process.156 Accordingly, a moratorium on such increases has
been proposed.157 Similarly, a combination of inflation and inflexi-
ble tax rate brackets has artificially subjected most Americans to
higher income tax rates, leaving them with less real spendable in-
come than in the past.' 58 This phenomenon of having less while
making more is popularly referred to as the government's "windfall
tax," which clearly erodes and discourages savings.15 9 For this rea-
son, some form of adjustment and indexing of tax brackets has
been suggested. 160
More liberal depreciation deduction"' and the extension of
Eye Next Year's Election, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Talk of Tax Cuts: Some-
thing for All, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1979, at 83; Wood, Jr., Another Look at a
Tax Cut, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979, § 3, at 14, col. 3.
154. See Showdown, supra note 65, at 41. ("[O]ur Social Security system diverts money
from savings into consumption. Americans will pay around $140 billion of Social Security
taxes in 1980, vastly more than all personal savings combined.")
155. I.R.C. § 275(a)(1)(A) specifically provides for the nondeductibility of Social Secur.
ity contributions by employees.
156. See Rankin, Social Security Wage Base Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1980, at 32, col. 1.
157. See Coming: Major Overhaul of Social Security, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec.
10, 1979, at 64. Some have even called for the repeal of the Social Security Tax. See Long
Seeks to Repeal Social Security Tax and Replace It With a Value-Added Levy, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 4, 1978, at 8, col. 2. But see Panel on Social Security Opposes Rollback In Payroll Tax
Increases Set for Next Year, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1980, at 7, col. 1.
158. Malabre, Jr., As Salaries Climb With Prices, People Pay More of Income in Taxes
Despite Rate Cuts, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1979, at 48, col. 1.
159. Forbes, Jr., When The Irresponsible Becomes Responsible, FOBEs, Aug. 20, 1979,
at 31 ("A cut in marginal tax rates would not simply boost consumption; it would encourage
people to save and invest and to work more productively. When personal rates were cut in
1964-65, total individual savings jumped nearly 40% in two years." Id.)
160. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 153.
161. See Hughey, 10-5-3 or fight, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1979, at 37.
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the investment credit to research and experimental expenditures16 2
have also been proposed, both of which will be beneficial to capital
formation. The rationale behind such proposals is sound; both as-
sist a business in financing capital expansion or in achieving tech-
nological advances. The investment credit directly reduces taxes by
offering a bonus, thus inducing the desired investment towards re-
search. The proposed Capital Cost Recovery Act of 197963 recog-
nizes that existing tax rules discourage new capital investment. At
present, firms must depreciate their plant and equipment on a his-
toric cost basis over the "useful life" of such property, which aver-
ages about twenty-five years for structures and eleven years for
equipment, even though inflation raises the replacement cost of
the property."" The bill would allow companies to depreciate all
structures over ten years, equipment over five years and light vehi-
cles over three years-hence the popular designation of the bill as
"10-5-3" depreciation. By materially accelerating depreciation al-
lowances, corporate taxes are reduced, resulting at least tempora-
rily in an improvement of corporate liquidity. This should lead to
increased investment in capital facilities. It should be noted, how-
ever, that 10-5-3 does not basically increase the aggregate depreci-
ation taken on an asset; it merely increases the rate of such deduc-
tion. Thus, although 10-5-3 will be a useful building block, it is
hardly a panacea to our capital formation short fall.
The Revenue Act of 1978 included provisions for reducing the
tax on capital gains.6 5 It is likely that there will be some opposi-
tion to alleviation of the double tax on dividends on the ground
that it is no longer essential to capital formation needs because of
162. See S. #700, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S3058 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1979),
which extends the investment credit to certain research and experimental expenditures.
163. See S. #1435, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CON. REc. S8665 (daily ed. June 27,
1979).
164. Hughey, supra note 161. See also Schiff, Depreciation: Fast, Faster and Fastest,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979, § 3, at 16, coL 3.
165. The Revenue Act of 1978 eliminated, as to individuals, the alternative capital
gains tax under I.R.C. § 1201(b), but increased the deduction for net capital gains (that is,
the excess of net long term capital gains over net short term capital losses for the year) from
50% to 60%. Thus, the present maximum tax on net capital gains is 28% (40% x 70%
maximum individual rate), whereas a 25% maximum was provided by § 1201(b) before the
enactment of the 1969 Tax Reform Act. See also Sloane, Tax Free Capital Gains Proposed,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1978, at 32, col. 1. Some persons feel that the capital gain preference
should be totally eliminated. See, e.g., Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains, 42 FoRDHrms
L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1973).
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the relief granted to capital gains by this Act. Such opposition is
unfounded. Although the two forms of relief complement each
other, they are primarily aimed at different targets. Capital gains
relief aids capital formation by inducing savings generally, but is
principally directed towards inducing venture or high risk capi-
tal,168 which is essential for the creation of new businesses and the
development of new ideas. 167 An investor does not risk capital on
an untried venture unless some tax concession is offered. "Without
a chance at big winnings, venture capital is a losers' game, as there
are inevitably more losses than gains."""8
Eliminating the double taxation of dividends would also en-
courage savings. 6 9 More importantly, it would direct the savings of
166. See Buckeley & Richert, Return of the Risk-Takers, Venture Capital is Plentiful
Once More, Partly Due to Change in Capital-Gains Tax, Wall St. J., June 15, 1979, at 42,
col. 1.; Venture Capital Comes Back, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 67. But see Capital-Gains
Tax Cut to Nowhere, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, § A, at 26, col. 1 ("No one knows whether
extra capital is flowing into small businesses, but as yet theie is no sign that these busi-
nesses are expanding plant and equipment." Id.). This comment is surprising in view of the
significant increase in venture capital since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1978. See,
e.g., Pappas, Demand for New Stock Issues During '79 Was Greater Than in Previous Six
Years, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1980, at 37, col. 1. Wallets Open Up For Risky Ventures, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1979, at 75.
167. McC Mathias, Jr., To Fuel Investment in Business, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1979, §
A, at 31, col. 1. When the 1978 Tax Reform Act lowered the top rate from 49% to 28%, it
encouraged the flow of additional savings into prospective high-growth investments. In fact,
[c]apital raised by professionally managed venture-capital firms soared to $215
million in 1978 ($165 million of it in the fourth quarter) from $40 million in 1976
and $19 million in 1977. A further increase, to $275 million, is estimated for
1979. As expected, money flowed to high-risk, high growth investments because
the lower capital-gains tax rate raised the after-tax rate of return and lowered
the risk premium associated with such investment.
Exchange Study, supra note 58, at 18-19.
Large established firms tend to be more conservative than small firms, which are innova-
tive. Wood, Jr., supra note 153. See also Birkelund, Who Would Finance a Xerox Today?,
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1976, § 3, at 12, col. 2.
168. Galluccio, Comeback for the dream merchants, FoRBEs, June 25, 1979, at 31.
169. In a report of the Securities Industry Association, a survey of 500 top and middle-
management executives with security holdings averaging around $100,000 revealed that of
five proposals to encourage savings and investments, the elimination of the double taxation
of dividends would be most effective. See Forbes, Jr., Will the Politicos Pay Attention?,
FoRBs, Mar. 3, 1980, at 23. The results of the survey are set forth below.
-Percentage of those who would- Hypothetical
make increased invest more in mean investment
investments common stocks increase
Proposal
Reduce maximum tax on
investment income from
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more cautious investors towards less venturesome equity shares.
This investment would insure the maintenance of adequate equity
financing ratios, which are required for well balanced financial
structures. 17 0 While both favorable capital gains rates and the
elimination of the double taxation of dividends would attract
funds to equity shares, thus slightly overlapping,'71 the former
more specifically induces funding for high risk situations, while the
latter attracts funds to more established dividend paying equities.
The two forms of'relief should be used in combination, rather than
be considered mutually exclusive.17 1
How will we alleviate the effects of tax revenue lost by the
enactment of this type of tax relief? 7 8 Perhaps part of the answer
is that the government should eliminate wasteful and unnecessary
items from future budgets.1 7 4 Moreover, some lost revenues will re-
turn through the expanded capital base and increased business ac-
70% to 50% .............. 55% 31% $ 8,100
Defer capital gains tax
on reinvested capital ....... 69 42 10,500
Reduce capital gains
holding period from
12 months to six ........... 48 39 9,800
Reduce double taxation
of dividends ............... 74 67 12,800
Increase dividend exclu-
sion from $100 to $500
for individuals and from
$200 to $1,000 for
couples ................... 60 54 5,800
Id. (emphasis added).
170. See notes 78-87 supra and accompanying text.
171. Investors seeking capital gains are also often attracted to less venturesome but
undervalued stocks, hoping for capital appreciation either through a merger, acquisition, or
in the marketplace generally, as the true value of the depressed stock is recognized. This
type of investor, however, is usually not a contributor of new capital to mature corporations
issuing new shares. If the stock price is truly undervalued, the issuer will rarely float new
shares at that low price, because it would tend to further dilute the value of its already
outstanding stock.
172. See generally Address by Arthur F. Burns, former Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve Board (Dec. 15, 1978), quoted in THE WanK iN Ravmw, Dec. 29, 1978, at 9.
173. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 51, which opposes partial integration because of the
anticipated revenue loss.
174. See, e.g., Sees billions in fraud, abuse, waste in fed. programs, N.Y. Daily News,
Jan. 14, 1980, at 10, col. 1; GAO Chief: Fraud and Waste Costing Taxpayers Billions, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 21, 1980, at 45.
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tivity.17 5 Other revenue raising proposals can counterbalance the
effect of the lost revenues;17 one of the present favorites being the
imposition of a Value-Added Tax, which may raise billions of dol-
lars annually.177
None of the discussion concerning other current tax proposals
is intended to be exhaustive, or necessarily supportive or critical.
Instead, it seeks to point out their differing objectives and the
ways in which they serve the need of capital formation. Political
realities often cause one worthy tax incentive to be traded off
against another. Realizing that each of these incentives has its own
loyal constituency, the discussion is intended to allay any fears
that support for other proposals is in any way inconsistent with
advocating relief for corporate dividends. In any event, our capital
formation needs can no longer await political compromises. Pro-
posals that exclude up to several hundred dollars of dividend or
interest income from taxation will have only a minimal effect on
equity funding because even if many investments are attracted,
they will undoubtedly be small. 7 8 Moreover, much of the money
175. See Accounting for Slower Growth, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1979, at 20, col. 1.
176. See, e.g., Kaplin, Uncovering the Underground Economy, Wall St. J., Mar. 31,
1980, at 20, col. 4; Treasury Urges Tax Withholding Plan For 'Independent Contractor'
Workers, Wall St. J., June 21, 1979, at 18, col. 3; see also ABC's of "Windfall"
Tax-Meaning to You, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., Apr. 7, 1980, at 71; Pierson, Long Says
Finance Panel Would Support Windfall Oil Tax Changes to Spur Output, Wall St. J., Jul.
12, 1979, at 4, col. 2.
177. See Ullman Introduces Value Added Tax Bill That Calls for Sweeping Changes
in Code, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 3, col. 2; If the U.S. Ever Switches to VAT-, U.S.
Naws & WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 1979, at 12. The value-added tax is an "excise tax imposed on
the value added at each step of the manufacturing and marketing process. Each firm collects
taxes on its sales but deducts those already paid on goods and services it buys." Id. For a
specific example of the operation of the tax, see id. See also Long Seeks to Repeal Social
Security Tax and Replace It With a Value-Added Levy, supra note 157, where it is esti-
mated that a 10% value-added tax "would raise $70 billion to $150 billion a year, depending
on the extent of exemptions for food, clothing, shelter and other necessities." Id. Only time
will tell whether this suggestion is viable. See generally Pro and Con, Enact a Value-Added
Tax?, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., Nov. 12, 1979, at 71; R.I.P. VAT?., FORBES, Dec. 10, 1979, at
13.
178. See Pub. L. No. 96-223 (1980) which amends I.R.C. § 1.16(a) to increase the divi-
dend/interest exclusion from $100 to $200 ($400 for a joint return). An increased dividend
exclusion merely nibbles at partial integration; as such, it will not satisfy corporate equity
needs. In addition, doubt has been expressed as to whether such legislation will promote
significant amounts of additional savings. See How to Fritter Away $2 Billion, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 1980, at 14, col. 1; Forbes, Jr., Incentive For Savings, FoRBEs, Jan. 21, 1980, at 23.
Finally, this approach is not favored because "interest on borrowed capital would still be
deductible while dividends on equity capital would not, [thus] so far as the corporation is
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attracted by such alternate interest exclusion legislation will be di-
rected towards deposits, which will principally favor the housing
industry.179
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate profits should be taxed the same as other prof-
its-only once. The disparity of treatment that now exists is par-
ticularly painful in a period of "bracket creep,"180 where inflation
involuntarily lifts individuals into higher tax brackets while erod-
ing their purchasing power. Moreover, lest any proposed relief ap-
pear to unduly favor the rich, consider that even with integration
corporate profits are subject to an individual tax rate of 70%.181
Ideally, full integration of corporate and individual income
taxes would provide the most complete solution. For reasons previ-
ously discussed, however, such integration appears impractical.182
Instead, some form of partial integration should be instituted. As
between the stockholder credit and relief at the corporate level, the
stockholder credit is preferable. 83 Furthermore, although a stock-
concerned it might leave largely unaffected the distortion in the corporation's debt--equity
choice." McLure supra note 49, at 552.
179. See Hyatt, supra note 142; Robbins, The Case for Deducting Savings Interest,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 3, at 16, col. 3; Tax Writers in Congress Prepare to Allow
Savers to Exempt Some of Interest Income, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1980, at 7, col. 1; Pub. L.
No. 96-223 (1980), which provides an income tax exemption for interest paid to individuals.
180. See, e.g., Flint, The biggest tax hike in history, FORBES, Apr. 14, 1980, at 33.
181. See notes 119, 131, & 132 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore:
It is shortsighted to dismiss tax policies to stimulate capital formation as
breaks for big business. Their main effect is to reduce the capital market wedge,
spur capital formation, and increase labor productivity, wages and national in-
come. The combination of inflation and our tax laws has systematically reduced
the return to saving and is part of the reason for our lower saving rate than that
in many other advanced economies.
Insufficient Capital Formation, USA TODAY, Feb. 1979, at 8 (quoting Michael J. Boskin, an
economist at Stanford University).
182. See notes 134-39 supra and accompanying text.
Up to now no country has adopted a system of full tax integration under
which a publicly held corporation would be treated essentially as a partnership.
Although such a proposal was made in 1966 by Canada's Carter Commission, it
was opposed by the Canadian business community and rejected by the Canadian
government. Gourevitch, supra note 125, at 110.
183. See notes 145-52 supra and accompanying text. See also Evaluation, supra note
50, at 620 ("The shareholder credit method provides greater opportunities for rational and
simple treatment of income of United States persons from foreign corporations and income
of foreign persons from United States corporations.") McLure, supra note 49, at 581-82.
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holder credit for the entire corporate tax allocable to distributions
would be more effective and equitable,1 political realities point to
a partial credit, such as in France and the United Kingdom.
In the final analysis, quite aside from cogent economic argu-
ments for relief, double taxation of corporate profits is patently
unfair. It is puzzling why one should have to plead in order to re-
vive an essential source of capital formation-a source whose very
malaise stems from the discriminatory treatment by the Internal
Revenue Code itself. Instead, the government should justify its sin-
gular treatment of corporate profits. Its insatiable need for revenue
is not a sufficient reason for the continuation of this policy. The
issue is not whether we can afford to sacrifice the bounty of double
taxation, but whether, considering the enormous capital needs of
the 1980's, can we afford not to.
184. But see Gourevitch, supra note 125, at 84. ("It is unclear, however, bow much of a
revenue loss governments are prepared to tolerate solely on grounds of tax equity.")
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